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I. INTRODUCTION .
Social welfare functions have long been the subjects of, and stumbling
blocks for, research into the optimal pattern of governmental intervention
in the supposedly unfettered market economy. If there existed a mapping
from cardinal individual welfare space onto the real line, the choice of
optimal social policies would be much simplified. However the non-
existence of such a construct and the substantiating reasons are now well
known.
But the government does intercede in the private sector in myriad
ways. A major justification for these actions, if not for their specific
form and magnitude, is the existence of public goods or external ities--
i.e., those particular goods and services which enter into the utility calcu-
lations of many more than the specific individuals who directly consume the
good or service, and the inability to restrict the (dis)satisfaction to those
consumers— the "free rider" problem.
In addition, there exists a large group of publicly run facilities which
fit Samuelson's definition of those for which it is technically possible to
limit consumption to the specified group of individuals. Thus one might be
tempted to "...convert [the] public good into a private good, and ... side-
step the vexing problem of collective expenditure, instead relying on the
free pricing mechanism." For the purposes of this paper we will denote these
as "publicly provided" goods. Elements of this set include zoos, municipal
swimming pools, libraries, museums, etc., and are in general characterized
by negligible uniform (with respect to time) user fees. These charges are
usually set by decentralized decision makers appointed or elected to oversee
"Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories," Review of Economics and Statistics
,
November 1958, p. 335.
the operation of the specific facility or related class of facilities. They
take as given the size of existing facilities and the approved budget passed
on by a more centralized decision group and attempt to live within these
2
financial bounds by setting user fees accordingly. This involves optimiza-
tion according to an objective function, whether explicitly or implicitly.
It appears to the authors that many times the criterion function used is
administrative simplicity (which is certainly not necessarily synonymous with
minimizing administrative costs or maximizing net revenue). Thus, because of
custom or lack of the disposition or expertise to analyze the full price/use/
revenue possibilities, uniform fee structures are adopted.
We will attempt to show in this paper that for many of the goods which
are publicly provided, a differentiated fee structure over time may well be
pareto superior to one which is uniform. That is, by effectively redistribu-
ting income through the fee structure when lump-sum transfers are beyond the
realm of feasibility, social welfare may be enhanced. This is accomplished
by varying the user fee by time period when it is not possible to do so by
income class directly.
To summarize, we will argue that, given that the subset of goods under
discussion are provided by the government (at whatever level) when the market
either also provides them or could have provided them (although in different
quantities), the reason for such intervention becomes important for pricing
2
We do not address the optimal size of the facility problem in that we are
primarily interested in the entry fee determination problem for existing
public facilities faced by the specific governmental group charged with its
operation.
This and other restrictions on the scope of the present paper are adopted
in an attempt to constructively react to criticisms of the literature such
as that of Houthakker (1958, p. 464).
"Much of the sterility of modern welfare economics can be attributed
to the neglect of institutional and technological constraints which
in reality make the range of possible solutions much narrower than
the theories would have us believe."
purposes. Many times by their very nature certain of these goods are intended
mainly for the consumption of a particular segment of the population. For
example, if there exist alternative private substitutes then the good is
publicly provided in order to directly subsidize its consumption by a
particular group. This may be a locale or income class. When this is the
case (as say in building a community swimming pool in a particular neighbor-
hood) then the original reason for the existence of the facility may be
obscured by an inappropriate fee structure which causes its use by members
of the target group to fall short of that envisioned when its size was
3determined.
In other cases, the facility is provided not specifically for one group,
but because of the nature of the particular good or service itself (e.g., a
museum or public library). In this case we will examine the conditions
under which, if a fee is charged, it is optimal to differentiate according
to time period.
The general nonoptimality of a uniform fee structure in peak load type
situations is well known. In practice however, this has only been applied
to goods and services produced under private auspices (even if publicly
regulated). In particular, with publicly provided goods such as those
mentioned earlier, uniformity is certainly the rule. To the extent this
is based on recognition of significant administrative costs it is totally
reasonable. However, in most cases it appears to be a matter of ignorance
on the part of the decision makers of some basic economic principles.
2
Thus we are considering the optimal pricing of goods which Samuel son has
identified as "paternalistic" in that they "are voted upon themselves by a
democratic people because they do not regard the results from spontaneous
market action as optimal." [Samuel son, 1955.]
That which we propose in this paper has much in common with the philos-
4
ophy embodied in Feldstein's recent paper. There he reiterates that in the
two part tariff literature, the fixed, uniform portion of the tariff has
been criticized as an essentially regressive head tax and notes that "what
is needed is a pricing rule that balances efficiency and distributional
equity subject to the constraint that every consumer must pay the same
5
marginal price and fixed charge."
We too are concerned with the welfare implications of the uniform fee
structure, in this case of publicly provided goods and services. However,
we have chosen to examine the potential welfare gains available to a
"community" (however defined) which allows the fee structure of the public
facility to be determined by differential periodic demands, while recog-
nizing that total fees collected must satisfy exogeneous revenue constraints.
Finally, we conclude by indicating that, in cases which fit the criterion
we set forth, it is possible to rely upon relatively readily available
quantitative market data in setting pricing policies which are socially
more desirable than that presently in use.
In the following section, we construct a model and examine the points just
raised. We have chosen to use the management of a municipal swimming pool as
the vehicle for discussion of the various aspects of the analytical structure
in terms of an existing and intuitively obvious problem. The model is easily
applicable to various other sorts of public pricing areas however.
4
"Equity and Efficiency in Public Sector Pricing: The Optimal Two Part
Tariff," ^JE May 1972.
5
Ibid
. , p. 175.
II. A MODEL .
Consider a decision maker (DM) who is charged with determining the
fee structure covering individual use of a public swimming pool. Assume
the facility was built with the expressed intent of helping a certain
segment of the population. For example, suppose we are dealing with a
community which contains both private, for-profit swim clubs and family-
owned swimming pools. The decision to build a municipal swimming pool is
usually motivated by the fact that a particular (in this case, income)
group does not have effective economic access to swimming facilities. In
most cases, partial federal funding is available for such projects under the
condition that the facility is geographically accessible to low income
groups.
However, the DM cannot for various social and legal reasons "antagonize"
the non-target groups in the population. This implies access must be con-
trolled in an objective manner. This in turn implies that the only rationing
mechanism will be price, ruling out such schemes such as "membership" cards
issued only to neighborhood residents, low income families, etc.
Assume there exist K groups in the society and J swimming periods.
We further assume different fees can be collected on the basis of age differen-
tials and swimming periods, but not on the basis of class differentials. The
constraints the DM faces are:
(i) a revenue constraint, i.e., the revenue from fees collected
must cover some specified portion of the costs of operating the facility.
This proportion y, is exogeneously given to the DM in the departmental
budget approved by, in this case, the city council.
(ii) a utility constraint, in that we do not wish to construct
a fee structure which would make any of the non-target groups any worse off
than they were before the pool began operation.
Then we define:
f h
P.. as the fee charged persons in the i age group to swim in the
1 J
j period. For example we may realistically have three age groups,
children, adults, and senior citizens, say. The J periods cover,
at least, the peak demand and off-peak demand swimming periods each
day of the planning period. Thus if we had morning, afternoon and
evening swimming sessions every day and the planning period was








x (P) as the demand for the Hicksian good by the k social group.
s. .(P) as the aggregate demand for swimming in the j period by the i
f~h 1
age group in the k social group. Thus s, . may be the demand
J. L.




. might be the total amount of swimming demanded by
f"h
affluent senior citizens in the j period, etc.
5 as the capacity of the swimming area in terms of square feet of pool
surface.
6 as the unit swimming space requirement for members of the i age
group.
Clearly here we are dealing with only the effect of the fee structure on the
non-target groups, recognizing that their tax bill may have changed as a result
of the facility having been built. This however, is outside the scope of the
DM's problem. For a discussion of the financing of such a facility through
non-user fees see Whipple [1974].
s
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Cls^S) as the operating cost of providing swimming services in the pool which
depends upon both its periodic use and the size of the facility, with
^— t-t^- ^ and 7r-+°° as s. + S + e , V e arbitrarily small9s
j
9s
ij dS 3 J
for any j e J. This then says that the specified cost function
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includes a "capacity constraint" on use of the pool in each period.
This ensures that the periodic price must be set such that the capacity
of the pool is not violated.
Without loss of generality, given the stated purposes of this paper, we
assume that the K social groups contain homogeneous members and thus consider
k k k
social group indirect utility functions U [s (P), x (P)], k e K rather than
those of individual members. Let h denote the target group.
The problem facing the DM is then to
Maximize
U
h [s h (P),x h (P)]
w.r.t P l v /» \ /j
Subject to (i) I Z { Z s k .(P)} P.. :> yC(s,S)




k (P),X k (P)] > U k , Vk f h, k e K
where U is some given positive number associated with that groups utility
before the pool was opened.
We must note at this point that the present paper by design does not deal
with the problem of congestion and the associated negative externalities in
the use of the pool. The definition of 6 and S as single deterministic
numbers stems from the authors' desire to focus attention on the possibilities
and reasons for differentiated fee structures which is a problem separable
from the congestion question.
8Then the first order conditions for an interior maximization take the
form:
^,|h ~ h „,,h „ Y h • 3s. 3s. . ,
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and where a is marginal utility of income for k budgetary unit.
(1)
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and n. and u are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the revenue
and utility constraints respectively. Given our homogeneity assumptions
regarding the social group members (1) may be written as
3s
k
l j k mn J j k
(3)
We may restrict our discussion to those cases in which the revenue
constraint is truly effective, i.e., in which n > 0, both because they
are the most interesting and because, mathematically, if n. = 0, (3)
implies that 3
k
= 0, V Mh, which says that y k = 0, V k^h. But this
violates the assumption that swimming is viewed as a "good" by the target
o
and hence cannot obtain.
Since the revenue constraint is "truly effective," i.e. constraint
(i) above holds with equality and the unconstrained optimum would have
been different without (i)'s presence, n is strictly positive and, if
3s!^
the (IJ) by (IJ) gross substitute matrix
k ^mT
= A is non-singular,
we can solve explicitly for the elements of the optimal fee structure.
p = z e E s
k
.






u Y ds (4)
(where the A.. are the cofactors of A). Thus the first term in the
right hand side of equation (4) reflects distributional or equity considerations
and the second term cost and capacity or efficiency considerations, as will
be discussed later.
8
Proof of this statement is straightforward and is therefore omitted in
the interest of brevity.
10
III. THE OPTIMAL FEE STRUCTURE
We now examine the possibility that the fee structure satisfying the
reduced form optimal ity conditions (4) will exhibit uniformity, i.e., that
P- = P_ V j,n c J and V T c I. That is we are defining uniformity with
ij in
respect to the time period within each given age group. In particular, we
will show that such a case, while not impossible, is unlikely to occur.
Theorem 1 . The fee structure will be proportional to marginal cost if (i)
the income distribution is optimal in the sense that the target groups'
welfare change due to a change in the magnitude of the revenue constraint
equals the weighted marginal utility of income of each of the other social
groups.
To prove Theorem 1 (and to facilitate future discussion) we first prove
the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 . If optimal lump sum income transfers are possible such that state-
ly |<
ment (i) in theorem 1 holds then a 3 = n-
Proof . Consider the two related maximization problems:
























where t is the lump sum tax (transfer). Let a be the multiplier associated
with the constraint in the Lagrangian.
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II. The original maximization problem set forth on page 7 above,
but with a modified revenue constraint as below to account for the lump sum
tax possibility explicitly:
Z Z P.. (I s
k
.(P,tk )) + Z t
k
= YC(s,S)
i j 1J k 1J k













and differentiating (5) with respect to t and P respectively
1 l P
i i -T1 + *T = - 1
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substituting a and recalling the definition of 3 as before. Again
substituting from (6) and (7), manipulating (8) and (9) yields (10) below,





















[ b ij,mn]( p ij " Y«1 |§T-> <°> (10)
Noting that [b. . ] is the net substitute matrix (in the present context)
and hence non-singular implies
Substituting for P.. in (9) collapses the bracketed term to 1 * (9) appears:
k Q ka 3 = n
Q.E.D.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows directly from Lemma 1.
Theorem 2
. If the total amount of income allocated to the purchase of
swimming remains constant with changes in the periodic swimming fees then
9
these fees will be proportional to periodic marginal cost.
9x
k
Proof . Noting that the assumption implies ^p— = V m, m, k in the
neighborhood of the optimal values of the P-j,-'s, and that using we may derive






M^Hifmn + ny$ 8Cm ds. (ID
This corresponds to Lerner' s "first rule of ideal taxation" [5] in which
he maintains that proportionality will be kept if the shifting of resources
which results from the imposition of a tax is within the taxed sector.
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where B . . mn is the cofactor of the IJ x IJ gross substitution matrix B
dsU k k
of the form I p^- a $ and |B| is the determinant of B. The result is
, k mn
immediate.
The immediate impact of theorems 1 and 2 is that under fairly restrictive
assumptions the determination of the optimal fee structure is based solely
upon efficiency rather than equity considerations. Thus the present model
by considering the group welfare instead of that of the individual as in
Dixit [2], and by considering the distributional problems associated with n
k k
being different than a $ , which was not examined by Baumol and Bradford [1 ]
impl icitly
whoA assumed n. = aB = 1 , we are able to derive an expression for the effect
of equity considerations on the determination of the optimal price or fee
structure.
However, even in the cases above where equity considerations are made
unnecessary in the pricing decision, there is no guarantee that uniformity is
optimal, as the peak load pricing literature indicates. That is, with differential
demands - the existence of peak and off-peak periods - uniform pricing is in
general suboptimal
.
Adding in the cases where the necessity for equity considerations exists
then will tend to make a uniform optimal fee structure even more unlikely.
The question which remains to be answered concerns the sensitivity of this
non-uniformity tendency to changes in the proportion of costs which must be
covered by fee revenue.
Assume that all costs must be covered (i.e., y=l), that a uniform fee
structure is optimal with the given demand situations etc., and that the pool
We note that equation (11) may be viewed as a generalized version of the
fundamental equation (11) in Dixit [ 2], or the "general rule," equation (9),
in Baumol and Bradford [ l].
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will operate at capacity in at least one, but not all periods. Then, in
the absence of the shifting peak problem, this existence of peak and off-peak
periods guarantees that the optimal fee structure will never be uniform with
Y < 1.
To see this recall that the periodic price is used to insure that the
capacity constraint is not violated. Thus if y is reduced, such that total
required revenue falls, the price in the "maximal peak period" -- that at
capacity already -- cannot be reduced to the same degree as that in the "off-
peak" periods, which must be reduced as much as possible in order to maximize
utility of the social groups. Thus if the original fee structure was uniform
over the periods, it no longer will be, for any y < 1.
To consider the general case of the sensitivity of the periodic prices to
changes in the size of required revenue, (assuming linearity of the demand
functions for simplicity) we differentiate (4) to derive the following expression
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t mn 3s.
3P
This must be non-negative since v negative implies that an increase in
required revenue to be raised through the fee structure could be accomplished
by lowering at least some of the prices. But this violates the original
utility maximization as discussed earlier.
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Case 1 . Efficiency considerations only .
If we again assume existence of an optimal income distribution in the
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.
Thus, if the cost function can be approximated by a linear function in two
periods
-^ = <$
m f^~ , such that if the pool is operating at different
J
levels in the two periods, the optimal rate of change of the periodic fees
will be different.
Case 2 . Efficiency and Equity Considerations Necessitated .
In this case the full form of equation (12) must be evaluated and com-
pared among periods: (a) If we begin from a uniform fee structure, then
changes in y which yield different rates of change in the fees will tend
to differentiate the fee structure; (b) On the other hand, beginning from a
differentiated fee structure, changes in y may yield a tendency toward
uniformity; or (c) To further divergence. At best, it appears that uniformity
is an "unstable" (with respect to the revenue constraint) equilibrium. This
is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1
11
Recall that we are not speaking of operation at capacity in this case and
therefore the linear approximation is not unrealistic.
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The combination of functions p, and p~ illustrate situation (a)
above, while that of p, and p3 illustrate (b) and that of p« and p3 ,
(c). Only if all periodic rates-of-change- functions for a given age group
are coincident with respect to y will a uniform fee structure be optimal
and stable. This, as inspection of (12) and (13) indicate, is not likely.
17
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR DATA REQUIREMENTS
.
We want to turn now to a discussion of the meaning and implications of
the foregoing results for real-world pricing of publicly provided goods and
services.
Again using our swimming pool as the point of discussion, suppose that
the systems analyst consulting the director of parks and recreation elicits
the decision that the "objective" of operating the pool is to maximize the
use of the pool, while ensuring that its revenues cover operating costs. In
this case the optimization problem becomes fairly simple in that the condi-
tions the solution must satisfy include those which require that the admis-
sion price set for each period must be that at which net marginal revenue
from admissions equals either zero or the shadow price of the capacity con-
straint, whichever is larger. Thus, given the existence of a large portion
of" fixed" operating costs if the pool is open at all, if it can be established
that there exist different demands for swimming in the various periods as a
function of price, then the optimal fee structure will not be uniform.
This possibility could be established through the collection of either histor-
ical or experimental data on observed attendance in, for example, the morning
vs evening (or afternoon) with a given uniform price. A continuing experiment
in varying the uniform prices could lead to an estimation of the form of the
separate periodic demand functions, which would then be used to set the
estimated globally optimum (differentiated) fee structure for the pool.
Of course, if the objective function is not quite as simplistic--say
it is rather to maximize the attendance of a target group such as we dis-
cussed earlier--then the data collection problem becomes somewhat more complex,
If the constraint remains as above--that is, to meet a revenue minimum—then
an experiment such as discussed earlier may be sufficient* to establish
*Depending on the percentage of the target group who presently use the pool
,
and the extent to which this can be validated.
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estimates of the general populace demands for swimming, but additional
experimental market or survey data will be needed. Thus, a survey of a low
income area which is identical with the residence space of the target group
could be used to establish present use at prevailing prices and one or two
estimates of use at possible alternative prices, in the various time
periods. This would be used to estimate the set of periodic target group
demand functions which could then be compared and contrasted with those of
the general populace. If they proved to be statistically significantly
different, then they would be used in the newly structured optimization
problem to drive the set of estimated optimal periodic prices. These would
very likely approach the "free swim in the off-peak-significant entrance fee
in the peak period" type of pricing sometimes used at present, but not widely.
Finally, consider the problem in the case where, although a target group
may be identifiable, it is not possible either to separately estimate their
demand functions for the publicly provided service or to exactly specify the
likely impact on overall utility of changes in the pricing policy. We submit
that the analysis presented in the previous section lends credence to the
position that a non-uniform pricing structure should be adopted at the time
of the opening of the facility if it can be reasonably expected that total
demand for the use of the facility will vary with time, ceteris paribus.
This type of information could be fairly easily generated through a general
populace telephone survey prior to the opening. The result--i.e. the
initially set differential fee structure—would not necessarily be "optimal,"
but it would in all probability yield a higher level of community utility from
the pool than a uniform fee. In addition, a gradient approach to selective
marginal changes in the fees in the individual time periods may lead at least
to a local optimum.
19
V. CONCLUSION .
In the context of the swimming pool problem setting, our results indicate
that much more thought need be given to setting different peak and off-peak
admission fees within a given age group. For example, given that the pool
was built for a lower income segment of the community, and that their demand
functions for swimming in a given period differ from those of the rest of
the community with respect to price , then lower prices or even "free swims"
in early afternoon or morning periods and correspondingly higher admission
fees in the peak late afternoon/evening periods may yield greater total
utility to the target group and keep the non-target group at least as well
off as before the pool was built, while still satisfying the revenue constraint,
Even if the pool is a neighborhood facility (where there is only one
social group), the model suggests that uniform fee structure may not be
opttmal if demands can be characterized as peak and off-peak.
In the general case, there seem to be many public or quasi-public
facilities which by differentiating their fee structure may yield superior
use patterns and hence utility gains. The full application of a model such
as this may be difficult given the size and composition of the groups which
are charged with setting such fees. However, approximations are possible and,
we believe, desirable using fairly straightforward data gathering experiments.
20
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